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 ‘I must brief you on the mistakes’: 
When Ronald Reagan met Margaret Thatcher, 
25-28 February 1981 
Abstract 
Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan gained power after promising similar 
solutions to the economic decline of the 1970s and are commonly viewed in the same 
‘New Right’ context.  Having met twice before in 1975 and 1978, the first meeting in 
February 1981, following their respective ascents to power, was popularly viewed as a 
diplomatic ‘love-in’ and a reaffirmation of the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ in 
the context of an emerging New Right hegemony.  However, this article demonstrates 
that even at this early stage, it was clear that the Reagan-Thatcher dynamic would be as 
much ‘political’ as would be ‘special’.  While Thatcher used her visit to the United States 
to establish herself as Reagan’s principle ally and to endorse his economic programme, 
she had also hoped that it would offer some political cover from Britain’s troubled 
economy.  However, Thatcher was undermined by the same administration that she was 
determined to support.  Thus, this article offers fresh and renewed insight about the 
emergence of New Right policies in the 1980s and revisits the Reagan-Thatcher 
relationship, highlighting its contradictions and complexities. 
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Introduction 
 
Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan won general elections in 1979 and 1980 
respectively as a result of the international instability and stagflation of the 1970s.  
Reagan and Thatcher saw their international interests converge as the Cold War re-
emerged, and they both promised to deliver parallel monetarist, free market, and 
incentive-based solutions to economic decline.1  When they met for the first time as 
world leaders in February 1981, it was clear that Reagan and Thatcher sought to 
demonstrate a commonality in domestic policy and closeness in foreign policy.  Such a 
show of unity would allow them both to enjoy political cover as they wrestled with 
economic challenges at home and Communism abroad.  However, behind that unity was 
a much more complicated picture, born out of the fact that in the 1980s the United States 
and Britain had very different economies.  For instance, whereas both Reagan and 
Thatcher inherited economies with high inflation and higher rates of income taxation that 
they would seek to reduce, but, in contrast to the American case, the British economy was 
arguably defined by its nationalised industries and subsequent power of the trade unions 
related to them.  Therefore, while the Reaganite and Thatcherite solutions could be 
superficially similar, they had to differ in important details.  As a result, there was the 
risk that either side would have an interest in disowning the meeting’s display of 
unanimity.  This meeting also raises questions about what summits can really achieve, the 
differences between rhetoric and reality, and the nature of the early relationship between 
Reagan and Thatcher and their administrations.  Over time, their relationship would 
develop strongly – albeit based perhaps more on friendship, admiration and shared 
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philosophy, rather than on total agreement about specific policies.2  But if they were to 
reaffirm the ‘special relationship’, Reagan and Thatcher would need to emulate the 
successful meetings of their predecessors, particularly those of President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, and President John F. Kennedy and Harold Macmillan, 
and of course avoid the difficult relationships of President Nixon with Harold Wilson and 
his successor Edward Heath.3             
 
Thatcher’s first general election victory certainly inspired Reagan and the 
Republican Party.  Following two earlier meetings, in 1975 and 1977, prior to their 
respective ascents to power, Reagan telephoned Thatcher to congratulate her upon her 
election as prime minister in 1979.  Unfortunately for him, the civil service saw no need 
to prioritise a call from the former Governor of California and a failed presidential 
candidate, so Reagan was unable to speak with the new prime minister.4  However, 
eighteen months later, Richard Allen, Reagan’s first national security advisor, ensured 
that Thatcher’s congratulatory message was prioritised and handed to Reagan: the new 
president-elect read it to his supporters at his victory party in California.5 Thatcher’s 
importance extended beyond Reagan and the Reaganites, to the Republican National 
Committee (RNC).  The Republicans badly needed inspiration following the Vietnam 
War, Watergate, and Gerald Ford’s defeat by Jimmy Carter in 1976.6  William E. Brock 
III, who had been appointed chairman of the RNC in January 1977, sought to learn 
lessons from political parties overseas.  For instance, the Republicans adapted a 
Conservative advertisement that showed a young man ahead in a race, but slowed down 
by the heavy burden of carrying too much taxation, regulation and bureaucracy.  
 4 
Originally, the young athlete had represented Britain; in the Republican version the 
athlete represented the United States.7  As Brock explained to the journalist Geoffrey 
Smith, who was developing his book, Reagan and Thatcher: ‘there was nothing that even 
came close to having the impact that the 1979 election in Great Britain had upon us’.8     
 
The ‘special relationship’ between Reagan and Thatcher, and their parallel 
domestic policies, has been celebrated in works of ‘higher journalism’.9 For instance, the 
journalist Hugo Young argued that Thatcher received a hero’s welcome in America in 
1981.10  Young notes that Thatcher was ‘a kind of Baptist to Reagan’s Messiah’.11  
Historians are only now challenging this consensus with two recent monographs focusing 
respectively on the differences in the administrations’ foreign and domestic policies.12  
Even while Thatcher sought to establish herself as a strong ally of the Carter 
administration13 and the Republicans admired her electoral success, the American New 
Right was suspicious of her economic policy.  Following the 1979 UK Budget, Arthur 
Laffer, the godfather of supply-side economics, criticised Thatcher in the Wall Street 
Journal, on the basis that she had reversed the position she took in Opposition.  Thatcher 
had advocated the merits of lower taxes as incentives for economic growth, but once in 
government effectively increased overall taxation through an increase in Value Added 
Tax (VAT).14  Laffer argued, 
 
From an American perspective, this is important to understand, or the wrong 
lessons will be learned from the impending U.K. economic failure.  
Commentators the world around have associated the Thatcher government with a 
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resurgence of classical incentive economics.  As it turns out, nothing could be 
further from the truth.  Unfortunately, reforming the previous government’s 
antibusiness policies will not be sufficient to re-establish a vigorous British 
economy in the face of the attempt to reduce the deficit with higher taxes.  Tax 
financed spending and higher taxes on labor are as bad, if not worse, than the 
previous Labor [sic.] Party agenda.15  
  
The first two years of the Thatcher government saw Britain’s economic hardships 
worsen.  For instance, in the period 1980-81, unemployment increased to 2.7 million and 
Britain’s gross national product decreased by 3.2 percent.16  The first telephone 
discussion between President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher (on the occasion of 
Reagan’s inauguration) highlighted American criticism of Thatcher’s domestic policies, 
and the leaders’ awareness of them: 
 
PR:  … Nancy and I are specially looking forward to welcoming you to 
Washington next month … I look forward to talking to you on international issues 
as well, as well as the economic problems we face. 
PM: The newspapers are saying mostly that President Reagan must avoid Mrs 
Thatcher’s mistakes so I must brief you on the mistakes.   
PR: I don’t think I have to worry about that.  I have just been watching and I 
know you have got such an uphill battle there but my goodness you’ve been 
staying there in the front line without rest or recreation. 
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PM: Well you know it makes it worth it when you are fighting for things we are 
fighting for then we have to give everything we’ve got. 
PR: We will lend strength to each other. 
PM: We will.17 
 
Despite Reagan’s solidarity with Thatcher, this paper will demonstrate that at this early 
stage of the relationship between the two administrations, Thatcher’s economic policy 
received a great deal of criticism from members of the Reagan administration and it was 
certainly hoped that Reagan’s economic policy would not replicate Thatcherism in its 
entirety in the United States.  American criticism of Thatcherism dominated the coverage 
of Thatcher’s official visit to the United States in February 1981 and represented an 
internationalisation of the debate about British domestic policy.  In other words, what 
was happening in Britain under New Right policies was deemed to be a warning about 
what could happen in the United States.  This context of Thatcher’s visit warrants 
examination and this paper is the only academic work to focus on this visit.  Furthermore, 
an analysis of this context confirms and strengthens the view taken in the emerging 
historiography of the Reagan-Thatcher relationship that the common features of the New 
Right in the United States and Britain has been overplayed by the earlier works of higher 
journalism, and adds to the study of summitry, broadly defined.18  
 
Planning the visit 
 
 7 
 Thatcher was the first major world leader to visit the Reagan White House: a clear 
signal that the Reagan administration hoped the ‘Iron Lady’ would prove to be a valuable 
ally in international affairs.  Thatcher’s staunch anti-communism, firm stance against the 
Soviet Union, and belief in the New Right economics of the supply-side and monetarism 
suggested that the visit would be a success. However, even on the British side, there were 
misgivings about this summit.  Alfred Sherman, a co-founder of the Centre for Policy 
Studies19, a right wing British think tank, wrote a briefing paper for the prime minister.  
The paper was seemingly handed to David Wolfson, Thatcher’s Chief of Staff, and was 
to be held back until after the 1981 Budget (in March) – so Thatcher would not read the 
briefing until after her meeting with Reagan.  In the extensive document, which was 
predominantly about foreign affairs, Sherman noted the negative and pragmatic attitude 
of the Republicans towards the Thatcherite project: 
 
The Thatcher-Reagan similarities are double-edged.  Until the [U.S.] elections, 
genuine and spontaneous pro-Thatcherism was really nationwide, and was used 
by Reaganites as a portent of victory.  Since November, Reaganites have quite 
brutally differentiated themselves from the Conservative government here, to 
counter forecasts by the East-coast media and defeated democrats [sic.] that as 
soon as the new administration learns the facts of life in domestic and foreign 
affairs it will act like Carter.20 
   
The British government had a defensive mind-set in with regard to economic 
policy, with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) stating that one objective was 
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to inform Reagan that the government was determined to continue its economic policies 
despite recent American criticism.21  A UK Treasury briefing for Thatcher noted how 
some American critics argued that the government had ‘deliberately engineered a 
recession’ while others argued that its monetarism was ‘sound but implementation has 
not been rigorous enough’.  For instance, David Stockman, the Director of the US Office 
of Management and the Budget (OMB) had discussed the ‘very disturbing’ results of 
British monetary policy and the gap between the rhetoric and reality of Thatcherite 
policies.22   Yet the Treasury officials associated British policy with that pursued by 
Reagan and the global economic situation.  They argued that the government shared 
Reagan’s ‘economic objectives’ and that the return of ‘non-inflationary growth’ in the 
United States was ‘very important for the rest of the world’.  The Treasury therefore 
sympathised with Reagan’s policies as tax-cuts and lower public spending would 
stimulate the private sector.  Nonetheless, the Treasury suggested that Thatcher ask about 
the potential difficulties with the US deficit should Congress resist spending cuts or 
economic growth was slower than expected, due to European concerns about US interest 
rates.  While they admitted difficulties in achieving its money supply targets, the 
Treasury officials were clearly in no mood to be lectured by their American 
counterparts.23  The FCO noted that there was still some debate as to whether ‘the United 
States has – or can regain – the economic muscle necessary to form the basis of a strong 
… defence posture and a more decisive role aboard’. 24  According to this briefing, 
Reagan had quickly sought to restore America’s economic fortunes simultaneously with 
increased expenditure on defence and policies in Central America ‘designed to contain 
the spread of communism’.25  Whereas the Treasury’s briefing anticipated a difficult 
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discussion about economic policy, the Department of Trade’s briefing about the extra-
territorial applications of US anti-Trust laws was a harbinger of Reagan’s controversial 
intervention in the Freddie Laker case which allowed Thatcher to privatise British 
Airways.26  The briefing suggested Thatcher make the point that such applications were: 
‘A persistent irritant in UK/US relations … However, all I want to do now is to record 
that, depending on developments in these cases, I may need to raise this matter with you 
again’.27  Taken as a whole, these briefings suggest that senior British government 
officials had no clear idea of exactly what would happen at the meeting.  
 
Despite apparent British concern over the way their economic policy was viewed 
in the United States, the FCO did not expect it to be a priority for discussion by the 
Reagan administration.  Thatcher was instead expecting the president would wish to 
ensure a cohesive foreign and defence policy in all spheres of the globe and a firm 
commitment to an assertive line against the USSR with his most important ally.28  In turn, 
Thatcher was offered a number of other briefings by government departments.  She was 
briefed on East/West relations; defence policy; defence equipment; Northern Ireland; 
regional questions; Vietnamese refugees; international economic and monetary policies; 
prospects for the forthcoming Mexico and Ottawa summits; energy; the extra-territorial 
application of US anti-Trust laws; counter-terrorism; Anglo-American defence co-
operation; and, United Nations matters (for her meeting with the UN Secretary General).  
According to the steering brief for the visit, Reagan’s domestic concerns would be 
dominated by the economy while his foreign policy emphasised the Soviet threat, 
consultation with allies, and issues such as El Salvador.  It was anticipated that the 
 10 
administration would listen to Thatcher as she was ‘an ally whom they much respect and 
with whose Government they feel they have much in common’.29  The British objectives 
for the visit were an unsurprising list for a first official visit: a formal exchange of ideas 
and consultation.  Their first priority was simply to reaffirm the importance of the Anglo-
American relationship and in its NATO and West European contexts.  The second 
objective was for Thatcher to strengthen Reagan’s apparent favourable opinion of her 
government (given their shared view of Communism and, at least superficially, similar 
domestic agenda). Views were to be exchanged on policy towards Poland, defence 
equipment and policy, the Middle East, opposition to sanctions towards South Africa and 
support for Namibian independence, the administration’s domestic and economic 
policies, the situation in Northern Ireland, and US policy towards Central America 
(particularly El Salvador and Belize).30   
 
Nevertheless, it is clear that the connections between American and British 
domestic policies were at the forefront of thinking by British government officials.  
Briefings by the Reagan administration show that this was also the case across the 
Atlantic, and in the critical fashion that was expected by British officials.  Martin 
Anderson, an administration economic adviser, circulated a memorandum to senior staff, 
which offered ‘a brief description between the economic program implemented in 
England by Prime Minister Thatcher and the economic program proposed by President 
Reagan’.31  Anderson acknowledged that the Conservative Party entered office in 1979 
‘with much the same rhetoric that surrounds the Reagan Administration’s economic 
program’ but ‘the substance of these programs has been very different’.  Firstly, the 
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memorandum pointed out that by almost doubling VAT to 15 percent to recover the lost 
revenue from the 1979 income tax cut, the government simply counterbalanced the 
supply-side incentives which those tax cuts had created (thus echoing Laffer’s criticism 
in the Wall Street Journal in 1979).  Furthermore, rather than continuing to cut taxes, the 
Thatcher government actually raised employee ‘social security’ contributions (national 
insurance) and taxation on tobacco, alcohol, and oil petroleum products.  The Reagan 
programme was deemed different, as it planned no tax increases and the tax cuts would 
increase incentives.  Secondly, the Thatcher government was reported to have actually 
increased spending whereas the Reagan administration proposed a significant reduction 
in spending (although ultimately that did not happen).  Thirdly, the Thatcher government 
was judged to have failed to meet its own monetary targets in its attempts to control the 
money supply yet the Reagan administration would work with the Federal Reserve 
System to do so.  Finally, the memorandum stated that the economic comparison was 
unfair as ‘the two countries are substantially different, including the fact that the U.S. is 
not so encumbered with money-losing state industries’.32   
 
Alexander Haig, the US Secretary of State, when briefing Reagan, advised a 
discussion of the economy: ‘Outline your economic strategy.  Mrs. Thatcher will want to 
share her own experiences in dealing with the British economy.’33  However, unlike 
Anderson who was seeking to simply distance Reaganism from Thatcherism for political 
purposes, Haig’s interest in Thatcherism stemmed from his belief that Thatcher’s 
economic fortunes were crucial to America’s international interests.  He acknowledged 
that the administration had ‘benefited from Mrs. Thatcher’s pro-American, anti-Soviet 
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instincts.  She believes in a politically active, outward-looking Britain.  Her cooperation 
is limited, however, by a deteriorating economic situation’.34  At the same time, Haig 
believed that economic deterioration had led to the decline in Thatcher’s political 
fortunes and the possibility of a Labour government, which would undermine American 
interests: 
 
While Mrs. Thatcher enjoys a substantial parliamentary majority, her political 
standing has eroded since her visit to Washington in December, 1979.  This 
results from a serious economic downturn and unemployment of ten percent.  
Mrs. Thatcher’s political future may be tied to the economy.  Elections must be 
held by Spring 1984.  The Labor opposition is embroiled in a left-right struggle 
over party policies and leadership.  The policies being expounded by the left, 
which is ascendant, would seriously detract from the UK’s role in NATO.35 
 
The State Department’s briefing paper therefore suggested to the president that he should: 
‘Exchange views with Thatcher on her experience, in part to learn from British mistakes 
… While she is trying to restructure an economy which in many ways is different from 
the US we share common problems.  Thatcher will be interested in your economic 
program and your plan for implementing it’.36 British government officials had been 
expecting such a conversation about domestic economic matters to be one-way, with the 
Reagan administration interested to learn from Thatcher’s experience.  Haig ostensibly 
believed that Thatcher’s poor economic record would mean that she would be keen on 
American advice as to how improve the British economy. 
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Despite Thatcher’s difficult domestic circumstances, Haig observed that the Prime 
Minister’s objectives would be to reaffirm the ‘special relationship’ and, in turn, Reagan 
should: ‘Demonstrate publicly and privately that Thatcher is the major Western leader 
most attuned to your views on East-West and security issues.’  Reagan was to urge 
Thatcher ‘to continue to support increased Western defense efforts’ [sic.] and ‘coordinate 
closely our response to Polish contingencies’.  Haig encouraged Reagan to ask Thatcher 
to delay the European Community’s policies for a Middle East settlement as members of 
the European Community advocated the participation of the Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation (PLO) until the administration’s policy review was finished and could offer 
a clear position. The key issues which Reagan was asked to consider raising were akin to 
those suggested to Thatcher by the FCO: East-West relations, US-UK-European 
relations, NATO defence effort, southwest Asian and Persian Gulf security, arms control 
and security issues, the Middle East, South Africa and Central America and the 
Caribbean.  There were clear similarities in the issues that the Reagan administration and 
Thatcher government hoped to address at the meeting.  Issues Haig noted Thatcher might 
raise but ‘recommended’ Reagan should avoid were the tenure of the NATO Secretary 
General, a two-way street in defence procurement, Northern Ireland, visa reciprocity, the 
UK-Canadian constitutional issue and Breeder Reactor cooperation.37   
  
In addition to the focus on the British economy, another theme emerges in the 
Reagan administration’s briefings: that of employing Thatcher in world affairs to 
American advantage, particularly with regard to European allies.  Ironically, the West 
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German government was also keen to utilise Thatcher’s perceived close relationship with 
Reagan to their advantage.   Counsellor Goldschmitt of the West German Embassy 
contacted the North America Department of the FCO to ask whether the Thatcher 
government ‘envisaged the UK having some sort of a role as a go-between between the 
United States and Europe’.38  According to the report, the West German government 
believed they ‘were going to be in for some difficulty with the Reagan administration 
because of the difference of view between the two Governments with regard to detente’.39  
In short, the utility of Thatcher in international affairs and the fate of the British economy 
were two key themes running through the preparation for the prime minister’s visit to the 
United States. 
  
 Thatcher’s visit also marked the White House’s desire to enhance Reagan’s 
‘domestic image’ as it was judged as ‘psychologically valuable to demonstrate that he is 
putting our relations with our major transatlantic partners on a basis which is different 
from the one prevailing in the recent past’.40  So, it was suggested that a ‘Presidential 
willingness to participate in some follow-up social activity to the official dinner would 
help underscore the substantive importance he is placing on our relationships with a 
number of key Allies’.41  The purpose of this was to contrast Reagan’s image with that of 
the previous Carter administration: ‘The public affairs impact of such participation could 
be enormous and would signal that we have moved beyond the loose rhetoric of “closer 
Allied cooperation” (so prevalent in the past) to some visible evidence that U.S. 
leadership in the person of its President really does have a special regard for our major 
partners.’42  That closeness was identified in the American press.  For instance, Philip 
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Geyelin, writing in The Washington Post, argued that ‘it is hard to imagine a more useful 
opportunity for Reagan and Thatcher to meet’ as the president needed ‘Thatcher's 
reinforcement for his economic designs’ and the prime minister’s ‘enthusiasm for the … 
tough line on the global Soviet threat’.43  Geyelin added that Thatcher could similarly 
benefit ‘from Reagan's endorsement of her profoundly unpopular economic policies’.44 
However, Reagan’s opponents used Thatcher’s visit to further their opposition to his 
programme.  This was noted even in the British press.  For instance, it was even reported 
in the Conservative-supporting Daily Express that Representative James Jones 
(Oklahoma), a Democrat and chair of the House Budget Committee, argued the United 
States should not follow Thatcher’s economic example.45  The planned ‘special’ 
relationship between Reagan and Thatcher would clearly be political too.    
 
The visit and aftermath 
 
 The prime minister had expressed concern to the British Ambassador to the 
United States, Sir Nicholas Henderson, prior to her departure for America.  In his diary, 
Henderson wrote: ‘Mrs T told me that she was a little worried by her forthcoming visit to 
Washington. She did not quite see how it would go.’  Thatcher ‘admitted to being 
nervous about it. She looked drawn – pale and rather distinguished. I did my best to 
reassure her, telling her how welcoming Reagan would be and how much he was looking 
forward to her arrival’.46 John Warden, writing for the Daily Express, equalled 
Henderson’s confidence: ‘Whatever her troubles at home she is still a winner in 
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Washington and they are fascinated by everything about her.’  After all, Thatcher had 
been unable ‘to satisfy all the press clamour for interviews’.47   
 
Indeed, at least on a personal level, Thatcher had no need to worry about meeting 
Reagan again and her arrival in the United States was marked by the flourish and pomp 
of a welcome ceremony with the president welcoming her in person with great warmth to 
the White House. Reagan referred to the meetings that they had held before each had 
come to power and tied them into a common agenda for their time in office: 
When we talked in London just over 2 years ago -- when neither of us was in 
office -- I was impressed by the similar challenges our countries faced and by our 
determination to meet those challenges. You have said that we enter into a decade 
fraught with danger, and so we have. But the decade will be less dangerous if the 
West maintains the strength required for peace, and in achieving that goal, there is 
one element that goes without question: Britain and America will stand side by 
side.48 
In response to Reagan’s welcome, Thatcher declared with equal warmth and firm 
economic purpose:  
Mr. President, the natural bond of interest between our two countries is 
strengthened by the common approach which you and I have to our national 
problems … We're both trying to set free the energies of our people. We're both 
determined to sweep away the restrictions that hold back enterprise. We both 
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place our faith not so much in economic theory but in the resourcefulness and the 
decency of ordinary people.49 
 
These words underline the importance both placed in a mutual endorsement of their 
domestic agendas. But that was not the main public point of the summit, and according to 
the minutes, the plenary meeting between the Reagan and Thatcher teams was, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, dominated by foreign policy.  However, the prime minister and the 
president did enjoy a tête- á-tête meeting alone in the Oval Office that overran.  The 
minutes of the plenary meeting allude to a wide-ranging prior discussion: 
 
President Reagan … said that, in their tete-a-tete meeting, he and the Prime 
Minister had discussed a number of subjects which were to the forefront of their 
minds at present … He regarded it as particularly vital to maintain the relationship 
which had existed for years between the United States and the United Kingdom: 
this required close consultation and co-operation.50  
 
In his diary, Reagan notes that their discussion included Cold War politics and the 
American and British economies.  He wrote: 
 
P.M. Margaret Thatcher arrived.  A most impressive ceremony on So. Lawn – 
review of troops etc.  We had a private meeting in Oval office. She is as firm as 
ever re the Soviets and for reduction of govt.  Expressed regret that she tried to 
 18 
reduce govt. spending a step at a time & was defeated in each attempt.  Said she 
should have done it our way – an entire package – all or nothing.51 
   
After the meetings, Reagan and Thatcher briefly addressed the press and both offered 
bland and uncontroversial accounts of their talks, although they did stress the common 
features in their policies.  Reagan observed, ‘Our deep ties and perceptions we share give 
us much to talk about. Together we're confronting an extremely grave international 
situation. We do so with determination and optimism.’52  Thatcher’s response inevitably 
certainly sought to aggrandise both her and Britain’s role in world affairs: ‘The President 
and I had a tête-á-tête for some time … we take the same view in the United States and 
Britain that our first duty to freedom is to defend our own … I really regard it as the 
beginning of a process of consultation’.53  It was reported that, in terms of foreign affairs, 
El Salvador and fears of Soviet expansionism dominated the talks.54  Thatcher’s 
opponents in the British press were not so convinced that the discussions had been 
successful.  For instance, Anthony Holden, writing in The Observer, claimed that 
Thatcher ‘choked on a jellybean in the Oval Office’ and that the aforementioned tête-á-
tête lasted only 40 minutes as Reagan and Thatcher were so inexperienced in foreign 
policy that their advisers were ‘called in to the rescue’.55   
 
Even though Thatcher was delighted by Reagan’s welcome and their discussions, 
her economic programme was under heavy criticism outside the White House.  Reagan 
wrote in his diary: ‘P.M. getting great press.  Went up to the hill and was literally an 
advocate for our ec. program.  Some of the Sen’s. tried to give her a bad time.  She put 
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them down firmly & with typical British courtesy.’56  However, it was Reagan’s Treasury 
Secretary, Donald Regan, who was most vehement in his criticism of the Thatcherite 
project.  As Holden observed, Thatcher’s meeting with the president was ‘all sweetness 
and light’ – but it was after her talks with Reagan ‘that things began to go wrong’.57  
Regan’s testimony to a Congressional committee at the very moment of her visit to the 
White House about the Thatcher government’s economic policy was scathing in its 
criticism of Thatcher’s policies and the British economy generally.  When asked to 
explain what mistakes Thatcher had made in her economic policy, Regan sought to 
distance the Reagan administration’s economic package from that implemented in 
Britain.  The treasury secretary’s detailed yet factually questionable remarks is best 
summed up by his opening gambit, the claim that ‘when Mrs Thatcher and her Party 
came into power practically 60% of the population in Gt Britain in one form or another 
was working for the Government.  Luckily we don’t have that in this country’.58  
(Regan’s statistic would later be corrected to a maximum of 30 percent of British workers 
employed in the public sector – see below.) In regards to Howe’s 1979 tax cuts, Regan 
simply echoed Laffer’s 1979 criticism.  In a final flourish, he argued: ‘We think that our 
programme is much more sensible, much more comprehensive, and with a greater degree 
of chance of success than the British experience.’59  This was not an isolated critique 
from the administration.  The previous week had seen Stockman advise the same 
Congressional committee that what Thatcher’s programme ‘has failed, as one would have 
expected’.60  According to Peter Simmonds, writing for The Sunday Telegraph, Reagan 
himself had told Thatcher that even though they faced similar economic problems, 
‘different solutions’ were needed to address them in their respective countries.61  Indeed, 
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the White House only compounded Regan’s criticisms by distributing a White Paper 
outlining the differences between Thatcherism and Reaganism (presumably Anderson’s 
memorandum62) and holding an explanatory briefing during which Murray Weidenbaum, 
the new chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, reiterated Regan’s comments.63       
  
 The Treasury decided to respond to Regan’s criticisms with a personal letter from 
Sir Kenneth Couzens (Second Permanent Secretary, Overseas Finance) to one of his 
American counterparts, Beryl Sprinkel (Under Secretary Designate, Monetary Affairs, 
US Treasury).  Couzens politely explained that the only transcription of the testimony 
was from the BBC, but if it was correct then ‘the Committee heard one or two mistakes 
of fact’.64  In similarly diplomatic language, he explained why, with Howe’s agreement, 
it was important for him to correct Regan’s statement:  
 
as has been repeatedly said during Mrs Thatcher’s visit to the United States, the 
main thrust of the economic policies of our two governments is so similar, it 
would be a pity if either side misunderstood what the other was doing … or were 
misinformed about the environment in which the attempt was being made.65        
 
For instance, Couzens noted that the population of the workforce who were employed by 
the British government in any capacity – including local authorities, the National Health 
Service and nationalised industries – was at most 30% and not 60%.  Moreover, it was 
pointed out that the vast majority were not working for the government directly but in the 
public sector more generally.  He defended the government’s economic policies, namely 
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on taxation, removal of exchange controls, and its (limited) success in increasing exports. 
However, despite his diplomatic approach, Couzens was also firm in his criticism of 
Regan’s statement: 
 
So there are good structural reasons why the struggle ought to be easier for you 
than it is for us.  But it is unhelpful, and also unrealistic to suggest that we have 
failed because of policy mistakes whereas you won’t because you won’t make 
any.  Our Government does not accept that it has failed, as you will have gathered 
from Mrs Thatcher.  We have after all reduced our rate of inflation faster in 1980 
than any other major country.  Anyway, as our Chancellor remarked, Finance 
Ministers have to stick together.  They don’t have many other friends when the 
going gets rough!66 
 
 Despite her avid support for Reagan’s firm stance against Soviet expansionism,67 
Thatcher’s media appearances in the United States saw a great deal of focus on her 
economic programme, with the American media keen to understand where Reaganomics 
might lead the country.  The prime minister sought to quell American criticism of her 
policies, but also endorse the programme of her closest ally – whose programme she 
linked with her own.  At the press conference for the Washington Press Club, of thirteen 
questions, six focused on Thatcher’s economic policies and they were interspersed with 
other questions regarding El Salvador, the Canadian constitution, the Middle East, the 
Gulf, and the Ottawa Summit.68  When asked by the Associated Press about differences 
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between American and British economic policies, Thatcher responded by praising the 
president and explaining the contrasting economic circumstances in the two countries: 
 
I think [Ronald Reagan] he's chosen just those very things which we also 
embarked upon and I think he's chosen to do them very boldly indeed, particularly 
the programmes to cut expenditure and it is the one thing which I could have 
wished that we had been even more successful at … We were faced with a 
number of problems which do not affect him … but I won't go on about those. 
 
However, Thatcher was pressed on the problems that her administration faced.  There 
was a clear gap between the overall purpose of her meeting with Reagan, namely foreign 
affairs, and what was designated to be a relatively minor area for discussion by both 
administrations, yet came to be equal billing: other domestic matters.  This is an example 
as to how summits are at the mercy of presentation, media interests, and events.  Jerry 
Edwin (Westinghouse Broadcasting) asked whether the government should intervene to 
aid weak industries.  Thatcher responded: ‘Well now, we have a whole series of a kind of 
industry which you don't. We have a number of nationalised monopoly industries and a 
number of others which are in the public sector but not monopolies.’69  Thatcher typically 
turned each question into a means to praise her government’s innovation: 
 
One of the endemic problems of Britain has been over-manning and demarcation 
disputes. And one of the side effects of the really rigerous [sic.] economic policy 
or disciplined economic policy which we are pursuing is to get the manning levels 
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where they should be. So those we indeed have to help. But we do it on the basis 
that they slim down to a size at which they will become viable and profitable.70  
 
Thatcher concluded strongly, stating: ‘we're not just prepared to subsidise yesterdays 
[sic.] jobs if they haven't a future tomorrow. We will look at those industries and say – 
we'll try to help you through the effects of change, but you must in fact make the change. 
Is that clear? Good’.  The prime minister was then asked directly by another reporter 
(representing Eaton) whether the Conservative Party would remove her from office if the 
economic situation did not improve.  Thatcher rejected such a claim and offered a 
detailed explanation of her government’s mission to tackle inflation, beginning with: ‘But 
I don't expect political defeat. Look what we are doing economically, its top priority – we 
have to fight inflation.’  Bob Clarke (A.B.C.) question Thatcher about when she decided 
to cut taxes and whether tax cuts should happen regardless of the economic 
circumstances.  In the context of the economic difficulties that were outlined such as oil 
shock and world recession, Thatcher explained: ‘The level of expenditure is higher than 
one would have wished. But in fact we did take down the direct rate of tax in our first 
budget. But I'm the first to admit that we've switched some of it, or most of it, to an 
indirect rate of tax. But there's no way of avoiding the world reality. There just isn't.’  She 
then refused to speculate on Peggy Simpson’s question about a prediction for the rate of 
American unemployment and inflation.  Addressing Simpson’s follow-up question about 
any backlash against her government’s policies, Thatcher offered a single-minded 
response that claimed British popular support for her agenda despite rising 
unemployment:   
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Of course when you're getting rising unemployment and a number of bankruptcies 
… and I'm one of the first people to be concerned … I know we have to go 
through with it and I think that one of the worst things a government can do is to 
take the short term easy popular road, knowing full well that it is sacrificing the 
longer term future of its people. And it's because I think many many people in 
Britain realise that ...71  
 
Interestingly, Thatcher seemed to finish her response by alluding to Simpson’s first 
question: ‘I must leave President Reagan to take responsibility for his problems.’72  
Thatcher’s interview for CBS morning news the following day was also dominated by the 
British economy and its role as a glimpse into the future under Reaganomics.73  This is 
what the American press wanted to know about Thatcher and clearly had preconceptions 
about her policies.  The first question tied Thatcherism and Reaganism together as 
‘almost identical’ and whether Thatcher had any advice for the president and the 
American people.  She responded: ‘I think he's started off in exactly the right way and I'm 
amazed at the speed that they got the package of public expenditure cuts before 
Congress.’74  After being asked whether the British ‘model’ had any lessons to offer the 
United States given its high unemployment, Thatcher defended her programme: ‘We 
came in at a time of the onset of world recession … So we are in fact laying the 
foundations for a confident economy for the future’.75 
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Thatcher also used a speech at Georgetown University that day to defend her 
economic policies in a detailed account of her government’s agenda and progress.76  
After contrasting her approach with the failed post-war British policies of incomes 
control and nationalisation with her policies, Thatcher likened her mission to that of the 
Reagan administration: ‘The President's goal is a stable price level. Ours too. The 
President's aim is to free the individual from government restraint. Ours too. The 
President's objective is to reduce public spending and cut direct taxes. Ours too.’77  In the 
same speech, Thatcher noted that Reagan’s economic objective was essentially ‘to restore 
people's trust in the dollar’.  She stressed that this was crucial not just for the American 
economy, but for the world too as international trade and finance revolved around the 
dollar.  Thatcher’s message was clear: ‘The dollar is the world's money.’78  According to 
Ian Aitken, writing in The Guardian, by articulating European concerns about the health 
of the US currency, Thatcher had, to an extent, ‘turned the tables on the criticism of her 
domestic economic mistakes’ previously expressed by Regan.79  Regardless, Thatcher’s 
support for Reagan’s economic programme must not be underestimated.  The following 
day, in a radio interview for Independent Radio News (IRN), Thatcher used a question 
about the British and American economies to praise Reagan’s programme.  Asked 
whether she had learnt anything from Reagan’s approach, she explained:  
 
I have been very impressed at the way in which they have put their package 
together in a few days and presented it to Congress. I think if that goes through it 
will be a wonderful foundation for the deep cuts in taxation they wish to make 
which I too would have wished to make.80  
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Thatcher again used the opportunity to defend her record: ‘We had a number of things to 
which we were pledged and we were not quite as free to move as he is and I just hope 
that his policy goes through Congress.’81  Given the Conservative majority in the House 
of Commons, in contrast to Reagan having to working with a Democrat controlled House 
of Representatives, it is unclear why Thatcher felt her movement to be more constrained 
than Reagan’s.  Perhaps she was envious of Reagan’s direct electoral mandate: she, on 
the other hand, was still working with the Tory ‘wets’ and was, therefore, to an extent, 
reliant on the goodwill and support of, for instance, Sir Ian Gilmour and Jim Prior.82    
  
 Reagan and Thatcher certainly formed a mutual appreciation society during the 
visit.  Reagan would return Thatcher’s support for his economic programme in typically 
diplomatic tones and praise.  In his toast at the dinner in the British Embassy, for 
example, Reagan likened Thatcher’s agenda to Winston Churchill’s mission to preserve 
British freedom during the darkest days of the Second World War.  The president 
defended Thatcher as a Churchillian-style politician leading Britain not just to economic 
recovery but also to victory over socialism and communism more generally: ‘the British 
people are once again about to pay homage to their beloved Sir Winston by doing him the 
honor of proving him wrong and showing the world that their finest hour is yet to 
come’.83  Peter Simmonds, writing in The Sunday Telegraph, suggested to its 
Conservative-supporting readership that such a comment from Reagan ‘sounded like an 
apology’ for Regan’s criticisms of Thatcher’s economic policies.84  Reagan was certainly 
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determined to publicly offer his ally political support – and did so by validating 
Thatcher’s domestic revolution with a Second World War analogy.      
 
Reagan’s personal warmth towards her allowed Thatcher to claim the summit had 
been a great success. She reported to Parliament afterwards in triumphant fashion, 
declaring: ‘The reception given to us in Washington was warm and generous, testifying 
to the health of the Anglo-American relationship and also to the excellent understanding 
that President Reagan and I had established even before either of us assumed our present 
responsibilities.’85  In his response, Michael Foot, the Labour Leader of the Opposition, 
mocked Thatcher: ‘In the United States the prime minister gave several homilies on our 
domestic affairs, but does she appreciate that the most friendly advice that she could have 
given to the United States was not to follow her example?’86  On foreign affairs, Foot 
criticised Thatcher for failing to warn the Reagan administration that in regards to issues 
such as El Salvador, they should learn the lessons of Vietnam.  Foot also held that, in 
terms of relations with the Soviet Union, Thatcher was wrong to join Reagan in 
challenging détente.87  Despite the criticism, Thatcher was firm in her belief in Reagan 
and his agenda.  In a letter of thanks to Henderson for his hard work on her visit, she 
added: ‘I have great confidence in the President.  I believe he will do things he wants to 
do – and he won’t give up.’88   
 
  Foot’s criticisms were not groundless.  Behind Reagan’s resolute public 
confidence in Thatcher, the political reality for the prime minister was much more 
problematic.  The precarious economic situation in Britain meant that the Reagan 
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administration did not completely reciprocate Thatcher’s public and private optimism.  In 
July 1981, Reagan was given a brief from Richard Allen, the National Security Adviser, 
following John Louis’s first report as US Ambassador to the United Kingdom.  The 
president was informed that there were ‘troubling political, social and economic drift’ 
and that Thatcher had ‘lost her grip on the political rudder’.89  His administration was 
concerned what the situation meant for U.S. interests as Labour ‘could prove harmful to 
our security interests even if reduced to a splinter group’.  Indeed, it was argued: ‘With 
no British leader seeming to have a clear idea of where or how to go, some political 
turbulence is likely, with adverse effect on the country’s reliability as a U.S. ally.’  The 
ambassador had even suggested that a visit from Reagan to Britain ‘could significantly 
strengthen both British resolve and the Western Alliance itself’.90 Later in the year, the 
Reagan administration still feared for Thatcher’s political future due to her economic 
policies. Louis ‘reported extensively on the growing difficulties Mrs. Thatcher confronts 
(some of them of her own making) in her domestic program’.91  The administration was 
even prepared for the ‘possibility of a Tory defeat, with the present government replaced 
by a coalition government’.92 The spectre of Thatcherism still haunted Reagan’s 
economic programme as well.  For instance, according to Alan H. Meltzer, writing in The 
New York Times in August 1981, domestic opponents of the Reagan administration 
claimed ‘that Reaganomics will produce Thatcheritis’.93  So care must be taken in 
accepting the favourable rhetoric of the president and the administration at face value.  In 
addition to the public criticism, these private concerns meant that going into 1982, there 
were real doubts about Thatcher’s prospects at the highest level. 
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Conclusion 
 
 In the 1970s and 1980s, funerals were often perceived as the most successful 
arena for summitry politics, for precisely the reason that unlike summits, funerals did not 
require press statements, the announcement of successes by all sides, large set piece 
events and all the paraphernalia that could distract from meaningful discussion.  In the 
British satire, Yes, Prime Minister, Jim Hacker observed on the death of the former 
British prime minister: ‘They're not coming here for the funeral, they're coming here for 
the politics. This is a working funeral.’94  Nevertheless, the 1981 meeting between 
Reagan and Thatcher can certainly be described as a success for the new US 
administration.    In foreign affairs, they discussed and established basic agreement upon 
a wide range of issues relating to the Cold War, all the while establishing Reagan’s 
determination to work effectively with the British government.95  Reagan certainly 
wanted to present the image of a strong relationship with Thatcher.  The president and 
first lady even broke with precedent by having Thatcher and her husband at the residence 
for coffee prior to their departure.96  This was in addition to the warm and positive 
remarks that Reagan and Thatcher said about each other during the visit.   
 
The British Conservative supporting press claimed the meeting as a victory for the 
prime minister.  For instance, the Daily Express typically argued that the visit was a 
success, immediately placing Reagan and Thatcher in the tradition of the ‘special 
relationship’: ‘The omens are good for a close working relationship between the 
President and the Prime Minister, similar perhaps to that which existed between President 
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Kennedy and Harold Macmillan, and Winston Churchill and Roosevelt.’97  Even The 
Guardian described Thatcher’s visit as ‘a political and diplomatic love-in’98 (albeit 
amongst politicians it obviously opposed).  James Brady, the White House Press 
Secretary, told American reporters: ‘It was difficult to pry them away from each other at 
the end’.99  It is clear that Thatcher succeeded in reaffirming the ‘special relationship’ – 
the primary objective of her visit.  However, Thatcher was unable to escape her domestic 
economic problems, and, despite the president’s enthusiasm for her personally, it is clear 
that the Reagan administration equalled the scepticism of the American media about 
Thatcher’s economic programme and political future.  Indeed, simultaneous to promoting 
a special relationship in foreign affairs, the Reagan administration successfully distanced 
its economic programme from that of its closest ally.  Paradoxically, it achieved this at 
the same time as Thatcher was consistently supporting Reagan’s economic agenda.     
 
Yet Thatcher’s visit to the United States in 1981 suggests more than an American 
concern about Thatcherism and a mutual desire to restate the ‘special relationship’.  
Moreover, it shows that it is simplistic to claim that Thatcherism and Reaganism were the 
same policies.  If anything, Reaganites sought to distance themselves from their British 
counterparts.  Paradoxically, this meeting between Reagan and Thatcher demonstrate 
both the Reaganite and Thatcherite search for allies conflicting with the Reagan 
administration’s ambitions and anxieties at the start of a first term.  Thus, the connections 
and comparisons between the two governments as simply being the same New Right 
policy prescription in action must be questioned.  Reagan and Thatcher may have agreed 
on a broad philosophy, but in policy detail they differed and the Reagan administration 
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was not afraid to say so.  This reflects an internationalisation of domestic policy and 
politics:  the politics and policies of one country influencing debate in another.  British 
affairs were of a great deal of interest in the United States, and that interest was, in turn, 
the focus of British interest.  Nevertheless, despite the Reagan administration’s criticism 
of Thatcherism, in terms of foreign affairs, they were determined to establish Thatcher as 
a credible partner for the president on the world stage in order to have a strong ally in 
Western Europe.  This was to be an on-going concern even as the British recession 
progressed.  Thatcher did achieve her desire to present herself as Reagan’s prime ally, 
although she clearly failed to convince his administration that Britain’s economic 
fortunes, and her political future, were completely secure. The embryonic relationship 
between Reagan and Thatcher may have been special, but it was most certainly political 
as well.  
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